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SETTING CONGRESS UP TO FAIL
MARGARET B. KWOKA*
Introduction
Justice Ginsburg’s recent public comments decrying the current court
as the most activist in history defined judicial activism as “readiness to
overturn legislation.” 1 As an example of this type of activism, she explicitly
referenced the Court’s decision to overturn a key portion of the Voting Rights
Act of 1965 in Shelby County v. Holder. 2 And as her dissent in that case
revealed, she believes the majority opinion failed to give Congress the
deference due a co-equal branch of government. 3
Interestingly, though, the majority and dissent talk past one another
in their analyses of the central issue in the case: whether the record amassed
by Congress justified the coverage formula used to determine which
jurisdictions would be subject to the VRA’s requirement that any changes to
voting procedures be “pre-cleared” with the Justice Department. While
Justice Ginsburg’s dissent details the voluminous and compelling accounts of
racial discrimination in voting procedures in districts covered by the
preclearance requirement, the majority, as she rightly points out, fails to
engage the legislative record. 4 Rather, the Court’s opinion dismissed the
utility of the legislative record on the grounds that it was not used to create
the coverage formula, but rather to justify it after the fact. 5
The Shelby County decision is the latest iteration of a dangerous trend
in judicial review of legislation. The Court has increasingly required
Congress to meet procedural standards akin to those required of
administrative agencies promulgating rules, in particular by measuring
legislation against the record Congress created. 6 Shelby County takes this
trend one step further by discounting the record before Congress because it
was created as a justification after the coverage formula had been chosen,
* Assistant Professor, University of Denver Sturm College of Law.
1 Adam Liptak, Court Is ‘One of Most Activist’ Ginsburg Says, Vowing to Stay, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24
2013, at A1.
2 Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S.Ct. 2612 (2013).
3 Shelby Cnty., 133 S.Ct. 2612, 2625 (2013) (Ginsburg J., dissenting).
4 Id. at 2644.
5 Shelby Cnty., 133 S.Ct. at 2629.
6 See generally William W. Buzbee & Robert A. Schapiro, Legislative Record Review, 54 STAN. L.
REV. 87, 136-43, 160-61 (2001).
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rather than having been used to decide what the coverage formula would be.7
The Court’s refusal to consider post-hoc rationalizations is akin to adopting
for Congress a foundational administrative review doctrine known as the
Chenery principle. 8 As this essay will explain, however, this requirement
sets Congress up to fail. Congress lacks the institutional design or
competency to create the kind of record the Court now demands, and that
demand ignores the reality of the legislative process.
Distinguishing Legislative From Administrative Records
The judiciary is well versed in reviewing records. In the most familiar
scenario, courts engage in appellate style review of adjudicatory records.
Primarily, appellate courts review records created by trial courts. Those
records consist of a memorialization of all evidence and argumentation
received by the court, and thus is the whole universe of material considered
in reaching a decision. Similarly, when administrative agencies engage in
adjudications, the agency produces a record of the proceedings. 9 That record
is subject to review by the judiciary.
Processes that end in lawmaking, however, do not inherently produce a
“record” of the same variety. Nonetheless, courts must still review laws,
whether they are enacted by Congress or administratively adopted in the
form of regulations. In the administrative law context, judicial review of
regulations has included a review of the record relied on by the agency, and
agency practice accommodates the need for record creation. Notice-andcomment rulemaking, the most prevalent form of regulation, results in a
record of public comments, agency proposals, and a typically in-depth
explanatory justification of the final rule. 10 While the “record” in a
rulemaking process may not be as easily defined as an adjudicatory record,
judicial review of that record to determine if the final rule is adequately
justified is entirely possible. Moreover, under the Chenery principle, the
agency may only defend the final rule on the grounds that it offered
Shelby Cnty., 133 S.Ct. at 2628.
The Chenery principle comes from SEC v. Chenery Corporation, which held that agency actions
challenged in court must stand or fall on the justifications offered by the agency at the time the
decision was made, rather than any post-hoc rationalizations. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80,
87 (1943).
9 The type of record produced may depend on the nature of the proceedings, but the requirement
that the courts review the administrative record has been applied to formal and informal
proceedings alike. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (detailing that courts must “review the whole record or
those parts of it cited by a party”); see also Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S.
402, 419 (1971) (applying the record review requirement to informal proceedings).
10 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (requiring a “concise general statement of [the] basis and purpose” to
accompany each final rule); 1 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7.4, at 596
(5th ed. 2010) (explaining that “[t]he courts have replaced the statutory adjectives, ‘concise’ and
‘general’ with the judicial adjectives ‘detailed’ and ‘encyclopedic’”).
7
8
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contemporaneously with its decision, rather than relying on extra-record
reasons. 11
Reviewing a record for adequacy in the administrative law context,
including limiting the review to the confines of the record, is justified on
several grounds. Administrative agencies are designed to exercise technical,
scientific, and policy expertise and to investigate problems fully before
reaching a final policy decision. A record requirement ensures that the
agency’s investigation is memorialized and that the agency is basing its
decision on the exercise of its expertise. 12 Moreover, in the administrative
law context, the ultimate decision-maker (e.g., an agency director) can collect
the materials that constitute the record. Record review is thus not only
possible, but also furthers the judiciary’s proper role of overseeing agency
actions to ensure they reflect a proper exercise of the power delegated to
them by Congress.
The idea of a record in the context of federal legislation has been
properly questioned as an incoherent or even impossible concept. 13
Lawmakers do not memorialize all of the facts or factors that are weighed in
their decisions. Legislators meet with lobbyists, policy groups, and
constituents for input, as well as having their own staffers conduct research
and make recommendations. This legislative process inherently occurs in
large part off the record. 14 The actual materials influencing 535 individual
decision-makers (or some subset of them who affirmatively vote on any piece
of legislation) are not only unknown, but likely unknowable. A record similar
to the record created in a trial simply is not available.
Moreover, imposing a record requirement risks “transform[ing]
Congress into a type of administrative agency subject to the control of the
superintending judiciary.” 15 Congress simply wouldn’t be able to engage in
the type of compromise or political maneuvering inherent in the legislative
process if it were subject to a the same kind of record requirement as are
agencies. While committee reports, floor statements, and hearing transcripts
may appear to create a sort of legislative record, they do not represent the
sort of comprehensive supporting material relied upon to come to a final
Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. at 87.
A. Christopher Bryant & Timothy J. Simeone, Remanding to Congress: The Supreme Court's
New “On the Record” Constitutional Review of Statutes, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 328, 371-72 (2001).
13 Buzbee & Schapiro, supra note 6, at 91.
14 Bryant & Simeone, supra note 12, at 385-86.
15 Harold J. Krent, Turning Congress into an Agency: The Propriety of Requiring Legislative
Findings, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 731, 739 (1996). Krent further argues that, like stringent
record review in the administrative context, requiring legislative records imposes costs on the
legislature and injects the judiciary into the policymaking process.
11
12
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position that can be found in a record created by an agency engaged in
rulemaking. Moreover, federal statutes may reflect policy choices that are
ideological and political, not policies grounded exclusively in an investigation
of only objective facts. 16 Accordingly, a court should not treat a legislative
record as reviewable in the same way as other record review.
Shelby County’s Impossible Mandate
In many contexts, courts, and in particular the Supreme Court, must
review legislation for constitutionality. In the rights protection context, this
typically rests on a review of the purpose of the legislation in relationship to
its means of accomplishing that goal. As others have observed, this inquiry
necessarily involves consideration of facts that “transcend the dispute.” 17 It is
perhaps neither surprising nor inappropriate that congressional findings—
whether embodied in the legislation itself or in various reports, statements,
and hearings—are considered by courts when ruling on these matters.
While congressional findings have long had a role in the constitutional
review of legislation, it is only relatively recently that the Court began a
searching inquiry into the adequacy of this so-called legislative record. 18 In
Board of Trustees v. Garrett, for instance, the Supreme Court struck down a
provision of the Americans with Disabilities Act on the ground that the
congressional record did not contain adequate findings of past discrimination
in state employment. 19 Importantly, the Court also refused to consider
relevant evidence of the type it required if that evidence was not in the
congressional record. 20 Thus, the review was suddenly limited to the
congressional record itself.
Shelby County involved exactly this type of review, in which the Court
had to determine if the preclearance measures reauthorized in the VRA were
sufficiently tailored to the current problems of voter discrimination. As it has
in other recent cases, the justices—both in the majority and in the dissent—
were keenly focused on the details of the record. Parts of the majority
opinion read like an opinion reviewing an agency action: the Court nitpicks
Congress’s statistics on voter registration 21 and combs through the evidence
to conclude that the incidents reported in the covered jurisdictions are
Bryant & Simeone, supra note 12, at 384 (suggesting various other reasons Congress may hold
hearings).
17 David L. Faigman, “Normative Constitutional Fact-finding”: Exploring the Empirical
Component of Constitutional Interpretation, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 541, 552-53 (1991).
18 Buzbee & Schapiro, supra note 6 at 99; Bryant & Simeone, supra note 12 at 332.
19 Board of Trustees v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 370 (2001).
20 Id. at 370-71 (refusing to consider evidence not submitted directly to Congress).
21 Shelby Cnty., 133 S.Ct. at 2626, 2627-28.
16
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insufficiently pervasive and not meaningfully different from those reported in
the non-covered jurisdictions. 22 The dissent, likewise, exhaustively details the
evidence Congress documented and draws the conclusion that the VRA’s
reauthorization was amply justified. 23 This type of analysis appears more
like administrative “hard look” review where courts review agency rules to
ensure the agency has not “relied on factors which Congress has not intended
it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem,
offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence
before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a
difference in view or the product of agency expertise.” 24 Yet, this type of
review is inappropriate for decisions made by a body of elected
representatives who, by their nature, are not simply exercising objective
expertise, are not expected to act as neutral decision makers, and are not
acting within the confines of an evidentiary record.
Courts should not constrain their review to look only at the
congressional record for predicate facts justifying particular legislation, nor
should Congress be required to produce a comprehensive record it lacks the
institutional capacity to create.
Despite these institutional barriers,
Congress believed it had learned its lesson from recent cases regarding the
need for a robust record: the legislative record it created for the
reauthorization of the VRA was more than 15,000 pages long. 25
Still, as it has before, the Court ended up requiring even more of
Congress than those legislators could have predicted. 26
However
inappropriate legislative record review is generally, the Shelby County Court
went a dangerous and unprecedented step further. Amazingly, the majority
opinion refused even to consider the record Congress had created. As the
majority acknowledged, Congress “compiled thousands of pages of evidence
before reauthorizing the Voting Rights Act.” 27 Nonetheless, after giving
virtually no consideration to the actual evidence, the Court recites what it
calls the “fundamental problem [that] Congress did not use the record it
compiled to shape a coverage formula.” 28 Indeed, the government itself had
Id. at 2629.
Id. (Ginsburg J., dissenting) at 2640-41.
24 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).
25 Shelby Cnty., (Ginsburg J., dissenting), 133 S.Ct. at 2636.
26 This is not the first time the Court has imposed record creation obligations that Congress could
not have anticipated. See Ruth Colker & James J. Brudney, Dissing Congress, 100 MICH. L. REV.
80, 85 (2001) (“Under the crystal ball approach, the Court effectively penalizes the enacting
Congress for failing to create a detailed legislative record, even though such a record requirement
could not reasonably have been anticipated at the moment of legislative deliberation and
enactment”).
27 Shelby Cnty., 133 S.Ct. at 2629.
28 Id.
22
23
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candidly argued that the formula was “reverse-engineered” in that Congress
came up with the coverage formula first and then later sought to justify it. 29
By ignoring the record entirely as having been irrelevantly compiled after a
coverage formula had been effectively chosen, though not yet enacted, the
Court essentially imposes a Chenery principle on review of Congress by
refusing to consider any justifications made after the fact.
While it sounds facially reasonable not to accept post hoc justifications,
the requirement is absurd when applied to Congress. It is clear why
Congress created a record to justify a decision it had already made. Members
of Congress had met with constituents, interest groups, lobbyists, experts,
and each other informally and formally about reauthorizing the VRA
probably thousands of times by the time the matter was formally under
consideration. Votes had been counted, political deals had been made, and
everyone knew the VRA would be reauthorized. The decision-making had
been done. Now all that remained was to create a record, as Congress knew
it must for the purpose of surviving a constitutional challenge.
The Court’s idea that Congress should first create a record of evidence
to study and only then decide how it wants to act is predicated on a fallacy.
The Court’s record review regime fails to account not only for the reality of
Congress’s role as a political body, but also the design of the legislative
process. In effect, the Court is asking of Congress something it will never be
able to deliver.
Conclusion

Shelby County represents the judicial activism Justice Ginsburg so
rightly identified. The majority opinion, however, lays the blame at the feet
of Congress for having failed to create an adequate record to support its
decision and implies that Congress could revisit the matter and correct its
mistakes. Not only does Shelby County represent the latest and one of the
worst examples of inappropriate legislative record review, it inexplicably
adds an additional administrative law constraint into the mix by disallowing
record evidence gathered after a decision has been effectively reached. As a
result of the Court’s trend toward reviewing Congress like it would an
administrative agency, Congress, designed not as a neutral expert but as a
political decision maker, is not likely to meet the standard the Court has set
out for it. In effect, the Court is setting Congress up to fail. 30
Id. at 2628.
Other instances have been identified where the Court has set a stringent record requirement
that is likely unattainable, thus setting Congress up to fail. See e.g., Colker & Brudney, supra
note 26, at 86 (noting that the type of evidence the Court said was required in Board of Trustees v.
Garrett “for practical reasons may be unattainable”).
29
30
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